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We investigate Nash Equilibrium in quantum games by quantizing the Battle of Sexes Game,
finding that there is no unique but infinite Nash Equilibrium in it. A method is also provided
to check that whether a quantum game has unique Nash Equilibrium, which could be helpful for
multi-player quantum games.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a very useful and important branch of mathematics beacuse it can solve many problems in economics,
social science and biology [1]. Recently, people are very interested in what would happen when one extends a classical
game into the quantum domain. They did lead to new sight into the nature of information [2–4] and quantum
algorithms [5].Also some marvelous results are found. Meyer quantized the PQ Game - a coin tossing game [6] -and
found out that one player could increase his expected payoff by implementing a quantum strategy against his classical
opposite. J.Eisert, M.Wilkens and M.Lewenstein [7] investigated the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the quantum world. They
found a unique Nash Equilibrium, which is different from the classical one, and the dilemma could be solved if the
two players applied quantum strategies and both players were better satisfied than in the classical world.
Not only 2-player games, but also multi-player games have been shown that better quantum strategies exist [8].
With all these achievement, it is natural to think that any classical game has a quantum version with better solution
(payoff) or even think that the quantized game definitely has a unique Nash Equilibrium, which is better than classical
one too.
Recently, Luca Marinatto and Tullio Weber studied the Battle of Sexes Game [9]. In that paper they proposed a
unique Nash Equilibrium and the dilemma was moved. However, Benjamin argued that the quantum Battle of the
Sexes game does not in fact have a unique solution [10]. We carefully study this problem and find out their approach
was more like a classical one with classical possibilities (denoted by “p” and “q”). In this paper, we first fully quantize
this game and find out that the quantum Sexes Game is much more complicated than the classical one. In this
game, there are virtually infinite Nash Equilibrium rather than unique, and the quantum payoff is no better than the
classical one. Further more, we prove that for general 2-player quantum games, if both players can apply any possible
pure strategy in the whole SU(2), there is virtually no Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we introduce a different method
for checking whether a game has a unique Nash Equilibrium or not.
II. FULL QUANTIZATION OF THE BATTLE OF SEXES GAME
Our physical model for quantizing the Battle of Sexes Game is presented by Eisert [7]. Here we depicted it with
quantum logic gates showed in Figure 1.
We send each player a classical 2-state system(a bit) in the zero state. UA and UB belong to the strategy space




















, ϕ, ψ, θ ∈ (−pi, pi) (1)

















The payoff matrix for the Battle of sexes game is given as following.
Bob Bob
O T
Alice O (α, β) (γ, γ)
Alice T (γ, γ) (β, α)
In the matrix, the first entry in the parenthesis denotes the payoff of Alice and the second of Bob, and in this game
α > β > γ.
We start the game with the initial state |Ψin〉 = J |OO〉, and the outcome state of the process is |Ψout〉 = J
+UA ⊗
UBJ |OO〉.
So the payoff function is {
$A = αPOO + βPTT + γ(POT + PTO)
$B = αPTT + βPOO + γ(PTO + POT )
(3)
Pστ is the probability of the different outcome after measurement. It is described by
Pστ =
∣∣〈στ | J+UA ⊗ UBJ |OO〉∣∣2 (4)
where σ,τ ∈ {O, T }.
A. Non-Entangled Strategy






















where A denotes Alice and B denotes Bob.















∀SA ∈ SU(2), ∀SB ∈ SU(2) (6)
The * denotes Nash Equilibrium.
We find three profiles of Nash Equilibrium.
1. {θ∗A = θ
∗





. The payoff for Alice is
α and for Bob is β .
2. {θ∗A = θ
∗
B = pi}. It means that Alice and Bob both use the flip operation iσx, which is equivalent to a NOT-Gate.
The payoff for Alice is β and for Bob is α .












We can see when δ = 0, which is the non-entangle condition, the whole procedure includes the classical Battle of
the Sexes Game and has no novel characters exceeding it. Also, if ϕ = 0, but δ 6= 0, the game appears completely
classical and the result is the same as when δ = 0.
B. Max-Entangled Strategy
If δ = pi
2
, which is the max-entangle condition, and ϕ 6= 0, the situation is quite different from the previous one and
the result is some kind strange.
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because of PTO + POT = 1− (POO + PTT ), the payoff is given by{
$A = (α− γ)POO + (β − γ)PTT + γ
$B = (β − γ)POO + (α− γ)PTT + γ
(8)





}, which is Nash Equilibrium in the






, because the initial state is |OO〉, the outcome state should be |TT 〉 . That is to say, Bob
can increase his payoff (form β to α) by unilaterally changing his own strategy.

































The interesting thing is that the payoff for Alice and Bob is always the same for any different Nash Equilibrium.
Alice always gets β and Bob always gets α . From the matrix we can see that strategy profile (2) and (3) cannot be
distinguished. Further more, they cannot be analogized by the classical counterpart.
C. Reason For Restricted Strategy Space
Here we prove that in general 2-player quantum games, if the players can apply any possible pure strategy in the
whole SU(2), there is virtually no Nash Equilibrium. Benjamin [10] pointed out for any UA ∈ SU(2),UB ∈ SU(2), we
can always find a matrix U ∈ SU(2) which satisfies
UA ⊗ UBJ |OO〉 = I ⊗ (UUB)J |OO〉 (9)
that is to say, if Alice’s strategy is given constant, Bob could make the outcome state be any eigenstate by unilaterally
changing his own strategy.
If the profile {S∗A, S
∗
B} is Nash Equilibrium. Because of equation (8), we can always find an S
′













B) = ($A)MAX (Because of the definition of
Nash Equilibrium).









B) = ($A)MAX (10)
















B) = ($B)00P00 + ($B)01P01 + ($B)10P10 + ($B)11P11
(12)
where Pστ = |〈στ | J
+UA ⊗ UBJ |OO〉|
2
,and σ, τ ∈ {0, 1}.
But for any σ, τ ∈ {0, 1},
($A)στ + ($B)στ 6 ($A)MAX + ($B)MAX (13)
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which is actually four inequations. And the inequations cannot be equations for any set of {σ, τ}. We add the two
equations in (12) together with inequation (13), so
($A)MAX + ($B)MAX < [($A)MAX + ($B)MAX ](P00 + P01 + P10 + P11)
= ($A)MAX + ($B)MAX (14)
where P00 + P01 + P10 + P11 = 1. This inequation could never be true. Hence in general 2-player quantum games, if
the players can apply any possible pure strategy in the whole SU(2), there’s virtually no Nash Equilibrium. This is
the reason why we restrict the strategy space to be a subset of the whole SU(2).
III. METHOD FOR SEARCHING NASH EQUILIBRIUM
If we change the initial state form |OO〉 to |TT 〉 , the Nash Equilibrium is all the same. But the outcome state hence
is |OO〉, and the payoff for Alice is α , and for Bob is β. So if we play the game according to the Nash Equilibrium,
we find that the outcome state seems to be related to the initial state, and the payoff is advantage to the one who is
in the disadvantage situation at first. It is natural to think this game is unfair. But if we notice that whatever the
initial state is, the Nash Equilibrium always “flips” it. In this perspective, it is actually a fair game to both players.
In order to judge whether a game has a unique Nash Equilibrium or not, we introduce a method that is closer to
the practical operational procedure.
First, we consider the Prisoner’ Dilemma [2]. We set the initial state be |CC〉 . So, how does Alice decide what
strategy to choose? She may first thinks that Bob will change his strategy to be D̂ , hence |Ψout〉 = |CD〉 and $B =
5 . Accordingly, Alice first changes her strategy to be Q̂ , hence now |Ψout〉 = |DC〉 and $A = 5. Alice then think:
Since this is a complete information game, Bob must know how I thought and must know I will choose Q̂, so he will
again change his strategy to be the best one which is Q̂ . Now if he choose Q̂, my best choice is Q̂. If I choose ,
his best choice is still Q̂. So Alice will definitely choose Q̂ as her strategy. Bob thinks just like Alice. So he chooses
Q̂, too. Thus they find the equilibrium. The following Figure describes Alice’s thinking process. The superscript i
denotes the i-th strategy changing of the player.




















































→ |Ψout〉 = |CC〉
Now we consider the Sexes Game. The following Figure describes Alice’s thinking process.




















































|Ψout〉 = |OO〉 = |Ψin〉
It is easy to see that this procedure cannot have equilibrium. Neither is to Bob’s thinking process. Both of them are
confused. They do not know how to make their own payoff best. We think this iterative procedure can be applied to
any 2-players static game and it is helpful in searching for Nash equilibrium. In this iterative procedure, if equilibrium
exists, it must be Nash Equilibrium and unique.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion we have fully quantized the Battle of the Sexes Game. The classical process of the game is included in
the non-entanglement situation. In particular the interesting thing is that, in the entangled situation, we find infinite
Nash equilibrium in the quantum game and the payoff is no better than it’s classical version. We then prove that
in most general 2-player static quantum games, there is no Nash equilibrium if both players can apply any possible
pure strategy in the whole SU(2). But this proving is no longer true while extending into static multi-player quantum
games. It seems that multi-player quantum games may have Nash Equilibrium with the whole SU(2) as strategy
space. So it is interesting to study multi-player games and the next work is in preparation.
We also introduce an iterative procedure that is closer to practical operating process in Prisoner’s dilemma and the
Battle of sexes game. While applying to general 2-player quantum games, this procedure can tell whether a game
has a unique Nash Equilibrium and find the Nash Equilibrium if it has. Just like the difficulty in extending 2-body
problem into 3-body problem in either classical domain or quantum domain, the difficulty in extending 2-player game
into multi-player game could be also great [12]. This iterative procedure may be an efficient method for multi-player
quantum games.
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V. FIGURECAPTION:
The setup of 2-player quantum game. Quantum gate J is encoding gate and J+ is decoding gate, each of them is
composed of a single rotation gate and a CNOT gate . Strategy moves of Alice and Bob are associated with unitary
operators UA and UB. J is a unitary operator which is known to both players and symmetric with respect to the











, δ represents the degree of entanglement.
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